



R&D and Wage Inequality
Andreas Hornstein and Per Krusell
W
age inequality has increased dramatically in the United States
since the late 1970s. In particular, we have witnessed growing
wage differences between groups deﬁned by observed skills such
as education or experience. For example, the college premium—that is, the
percentagedifferencebetweentheaveragewagesofcollege-educatedandnon-
college-educated workers—increased by a factor of four. Since at the same
timetherelativesupplyofcollege-educatedworkersincreased,wewouldhave
expected to see a fall of the college premium. The fact that a decrease did not
occur suggests that something else changed too. A natural candidate is tech-
nical change that has been “biased” toward skilled labor over this time. If the
nature of technical change makes skilled workers relatively more productive
than unskilled workers, then the wage gap will widen, assuming that market
wages reﬂect marginal productivities. But why should technical change be
biased more toward skilled labor? In fact, technical change sometimes has
been biased the other way. From a perspective of understanding the evolu-
tion of wage inequality, then, it is important to determine the possible bias of
technical change.
In this article we investigate the long-term determinants of the bias of
technicalchangeusingadynamicmodelwhereR&Disendogenousandcanbe
directedtospeciﬁcinputs. Oneofthekeydeterminantsoftheformoftechnical
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change, then, is wage inequality itself: with a high value of skilled workers—
a high skill premium—the value of new technologies directed for use with
skilled workers will rise. Thus, in our theory, wage inequality and technology
are simultaneously determined through a two-way feedback. We ﬁrst study
thelong-rundeterminationofwagesandtechnologiesbyconsideringlong-run
outcomes: steady states.
Our ultimate aim, however, is to understand what causes changes to the
equilibrium wage inequality. In particular, we want to evaluate the role of the
IT revolution in shaping the last thirty years of wages and productivity. We
think of the IT revolution as having been initiated in the mid-1970s; the deﬁn-
ing event was that the relative price of new capital, which is complementary
to skilled labor, fell signiﬁcantly. We then consider two quantitative experi-
ments. First, we consider a one-time fall in the relative price of new capital,
whichallowsustotraceouttheshort-rundynamicsofthismodel: Inresponse
to this impulse, how do wage inequality and the induced directed R&D react?
We then consider a gradual and persistent fall in the relative price of new
capital aimed at matching the actual behavior of this price series as measured
by U.S. data. Now the question is quantitative: What is the possible role of
the IT revolution, viewed this way, in accounting for the observed increase in
wage inequality and associated changes in productivity?
Why Is Wage Inequality Relevant to
Macroeconomists?
Ourquantitativetheoryhasjointimplicationsforwageinequalityandtechnol-




directed—both its composition and its effect on aggregate productivity—and
thus for predicting future productivity movements. We therefore believe that,
on a general methodological level, the development of quantitative theories
of the joint determination of wage inequality and technology is important for
furthering our understanding of aggregate economic performance.
Because of the connection between wages and technology, wage data are
an interesting testing ground for different theories about what is going on in
the aggregate economy. Namely, there has been widespread interest in what
has happened to aggregate productivity, especially in light of the “IT revolu-
tion”: hasITtechnology, andallthechangesintheworkplaceitseemstohave
led to, also delivered higher productivity? In conducting stabilization policy
especially,monetaryorotherwise,informationonthebehaviorofproductivity
is useful. Relatedly, is there unmeasured quality improvement in the goods
and services produced by the new economy? This information is particularlyA. Hornstein and P. Krusell: Capital-Embodiment Revolution 27
important in understanding how inﬂation really has inﬂuenced the purchas-
ing power of our money: with signiﬁcant unmeasured quality improvements,
we are better off than the inﬂation ﬁgures indicate. To the extent that wage
inequality speaks indirectly about productivity advances of different sorts, it
is therefore arguably an important variable to follow.
Aside from the role wage inequality has as an indicator of what is happen-
ing—and what will happen—to aggregate economic performance, it is also
relevant in itself and for understanding the political debate. Most obviously,
wage inequality is often part of the distributional goals of policymakers (and
voters),andindicationsofwideningwageinequalitymaybetakenascausefor
some kind of action by these groups. As economists, we perhaps have instinc-
tive reactions to caution against policies aimed at reducing wage inequality,
since we think they may reduce workers’ efforts to work hard, accumulate
human capital, and so on. The theory in this paper suggests that there are
other reasons to react: reductions in wage inequality will certainly change the
composition of R&D, and thus the nature of technology, and they are likely
to change aggregate productivity growth as well.
To the extent that externalities in research and labor market frictions are
not important, the market mechanism probably channels the R&D efforts to
its different uses quite efﬁciently, and thus one should caution against policies
leadingtowagecompression. However, withanimperfectlyfunctioningmar-
ket, the situation is more complicated. We do not characterize optimal policy
in the environment we study, but one could. Do the market imperfections lead
to too much or to too little wage inequality? The answer likely depends on
details of the imperfections, including those in the labor markets (which we
abstract from in this article). It is even a logical possibility that there is too
much equilibrium wage inequality from the perspective of efﬁcient R&D and
that wage-compressing policies would be beneﬁcial! However, it might also
be the reverse: such policies might be even more harmful than indicated by
our knee-jerk reactions. We hope to be able to address these important issues
in future work.
Capital-Embodied Technical Change and Wage
Inequality
A main purpose of our paper is the study of the short-, medium-, and long-run
effects on the economy of an “IT revolution”: of a burst in capital-embodied
technicalchange. Inparticular,wefocusonitsroleinwageinequalitybetween
skilled and unskilled labor and subsequent R&D efforts. In the postwar U.S.
economy,capital-embodiedtechnicalchangeseemstohavebeenanimportant
source of growth. As argued in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997),
to a ﬁrst approximation, capital-embodied technical change is reﬂected in
the decline of the price of new capital goods (such as computers and other28 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
equipment) relative to the price of consumption goods. Since in the United
States the relative price of new capital has been falling at an annual rate of
close to 3 percent, this channel has been responsible for a sizable fraction of
overall growth.
The implications of capital-embodied technology for wages alone have
been studied previously. In earlier work, Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and
Violante (referred to hereafter as KORV) (2000) estimate features of the
aggregate production function and use these features to argue that a higher
capital stock, induced by the fall in the price of new capital, must have in-
creased the relative productivity, and thus wage, of skilled labor, that is, the
skillpremium. TheargumentinKORV(2000)isbasedonapartialequilibrium
analysis and takes relative factor productivities and relative factor supplies as
given. In this paper we also take the latter as given; we take the view that
whereas the relative supply of skilled labor can be expected to change, it is
unlikely to be very elastic. For example, if we identify skilled labor with col-
lege graduates, then we might expect that, because of inherent ability-based
differences, the supply of college graduates has an upper limit or, alterna-
tively, that the average quality of college graduates would tend to fall as more
students choose to go to college.
Thecontributionofthispaperistheanalysisoftheequilibriumresponseof
relative factor productivities to changes in the relative price of capital. Unlike
changesintherelativesupplyoflabor,theredoesnotseemtobeanaturalupper
limittotechnologyimprovements,inparticulartotherelativeimprovementsof
different applications. In a number of recent papers,Acemoglu (1998, 2002a,
2002b, 2003) has argued forcefully and repeatedly that technical change is
endogenous and is purposefully directed to different uses, that is, specialized
for different kinds of workers/machines. We applyAcemoglu’s framework to
theparticularquestionofhowchangesintherelativepriceofcapitalaffectthe
relative incentives for productivity improvements that are speciﬁc to capital,
skilled labor, and unskilled labor.1
TheargumentinKORV(2000)thatcapitalaccumulationincreasestheskill
premium is based on the different substitution possibilities between the inputs
capital,skilledlabor,andunskilledlaborintheaggregateproductionfunction.
For any pair of inputs, basic economic theory suggests that if ﬁrms minimize
cost, then an input that becomes relatively more expensive is used relatively
less, holdingtheoutputtobeproducedﬁxed. Inotherwords, therelativeinput
ratio falls as the relative price increases. The question is whether the relative
1Acemoglu (2002b) has studied how the interaction of directed R&D with a change in the
relative supply of skilled labor affects wage inequality.A. Hornstein and P. Krusell: Capital-Embodiment Revolution 29
inputratiofallsrelativelymoreorlessthantherelativepriceincreases. Wesay
thattwoinputsaresubstitutes(complements)iffollowinga1percentincrease
of the relative input price, the relative input use declines by more (less) than 1
percent.2 Alternatively, we can ask by how much relative input prices have to
change such that input markets clear if the relative supply of inputs changes.
Thus, if two inputs are substitutes (complements) and the relative supply of
one input increases by 1 percent, then the relative price of that input has to fall
by less (more) than 1 percent such that the input markets clear.
Based on a wide range of empirical work and on independent estima-
tion, KORV (2000) argue that skilled labor is more complementary to capital,
whereas unskilled labor is more substitutable for capital. A higher capital
stock reduces the supply of skilled labor and unskilled labor relative to capi-
tal. Holdingthelaborendowmentsandproductivitiesﬁxed,thepriceofskilled
and unskilled labor relative to the price of capital thus increases in an equilib-
rium. Sinceskilledlaboriscomplementarytocapital,whereasunskilledlabor
is a substitute for capital, the price of skilled labor relative to capital has to
increase more than the price of unskilled labor relative to capital. Therefore,
the wage of skilled labor increases relative to the wage of unskilled labor.
Directed Technical Change and Factor Productivity
A major technological event such as the IT revolution will affect not only the
accumulation of capital but also the way R&D is conducted. In general, we
expect that R&D is purposefully directed toward improving the productivity
of activities where it will receive the highest rewards. From our perspec-
tive, the important distinction is whether R&D is directed toward improving
the productivity of skilled labor or unskilled labor, or whether it is used to
further increase the productivity of existing equipment capital. Many recent
technology developments seem skill-biased; for example, the development of
advanced software is performed by skilled labor. However, there are many
examples of how IT technology might also help unskilled labor improve its
productivity; cash registers, for example, have become very easy to use and
have drastically improved efﬁciency. Finally, general software development
can be viewed as improving the productivity of existing computers. Since all
these developments are the result of intentional research activities, and since
they have very different implications for the relative productivity of different
factors, understanding how these research activities respond to a fall in the
price of capital seems potentially quite important.
2 With perfect complements the relative input use does not respond at all to a change in
relative prices, and with perfect substitutes the relative input use may switch completely with a
change in relative prices.30 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Acemoglu (1998, 2002b, 2003) describes a simple framework of en-
dogenous technical change where R&D is purposefully directed toward the
productivity improvement of different inputs. An important ingredient of this
approach is that the returns to R&D that improve the productivity of an input
are proportional to the total income of that input. This creates a “market size”
effect of R&D: productivity-improving resources are allocated toward factor
markets with large factor income. With endogenous technical change, it is
quite possible that R&D resources are allocated to one factor at the expense of
another factor if the market for the neglected factor is small. In the long run,
the productivity of the neglected factor stagnates. Externalities in the R&D
process—that is, productivity improvements to one factor that spill over to
other factors—can overcome this effect such that in the long run productivity
improvementsproceedatthesamerateforfactorswithsmallandbigmarkets.
We now describe how purposeful R&D affects the interaction of technical
change and wage inequality.
We have already described how changes in the relative supply of capital
together with different degrees of substitutability in production affect relative
wages directly. More important, however, in an economy with directed R&D,
relative supply changes also affect relative factor incomes, depending on the
degree of substitutability. When factor productivities can change, the relevant
factorsupplyistheproductoffactorendowmentandfactorproductivity,thatis,
thenumberofavailableefﬁciencyunits. Nowsupposethattheeffectivesupply
of capital increases relative to the effective supply of skilled labor. Because
capitalandskilledlaborarecomplements,inanequilibriumthewageofskilled
labor relative to the price of capital has to increase by more than the supply
of skilled labor relative to capital falls, and the total payments to skilled labor
increase relative to payments to capital. Because of the market size effect,
R&D is then redirected toward making skilled labor more productive relative
to capital; that is, it increases the relative effective supply of skilled labor.
This in turn lowers the relative income of skilled labor, and the R&D process
is stable.
Nowconsideranincreaseofskilledlaborproductivityrelativetounskilled
labor productivity; that is, the effective relative supply of unskilled labor de-
clines. Because unskilled labor is a substitute for skilled labor and capital, in
anequilibriumthewageofunskilledlaborrelativetothewageofskilledlabor
has to increase by less than the relative supply of unskilled labor to skilled la-
borfalls,andthetotalpaymentstounskilledlabordeclinerelativetopayments
to skilled labor. Because of the market size effect, R&D is then redirected
away from making unskilled labor more productive and the relative produc-
tivity of unskilled labor falls. This in turn again reduces the relative effective
supply of unskilled labor, which in turn leads to even less R&D devoted to
improve the productivity of unskilled labor, and so on. If this process is not
stopped, the wage of unskilled labor will stagnate and over time will become
negligible relative to the wage of skilled labor. This is a process that we haveA. Hornstein and P. Krusell: Capital-Embodiment Revolution 31
not observed in the United States economic history.3 While there have been
changes in the skill premium, these changes have remained bounded.
In order to prevent unskilled wages from losing out relative to skilled
wages, we assume that there are research spillovers between skilled and
unskilled labor. This does not seem entirely unreasonable a priori, besides
helping ensure that the long-run shares of skilled and unskilled labor remain
balanced.4 This mechanism is similar to Acemoglu (2002b), who studies the
effectsofdirectedR&Dwhentherelativesupplyofskilledandunskilledlabor
is changing and skilled and unskilled labor are substitutes.5
Results
We ﬁnd that capital-embodied technical change together with induced factor-
speciﬁc technical change due to directed R&D signiﬁcantly raises the skill
premium, that is, increases wage inequality. We limit our analysis to the study
of balanced growth paths where each variable grows at a constant rate. On
thesebalancedgrowthpathsfactorincomeandexpendituresharesareconstant.
Weﬁndthataone-timeincreaseofproductivityinthecapital-goods-producing
sector generates a small but very persistent increase of the skill premium. In
the long run, however, wage inequality is not affected. As we have pointed
out, capital-embodied technical change is not a one-time event, but a process
that has been ongoing for a long time. We therefore consider a sequence
of repeated productivity improvements in the capital-goods-producing sector,
and this sequence generates a signiﬁcant increase in the skill premium that
persists for a very long time, even after there is no more capital-embodied
technical change.
The remainder of our paper is outlined as follows. In Section 1 we de-
scribethemodel—thatis,theenvironmentandthemarketstructure—andthen
characterize balanced growth paths of the model economy. In Section 2 we
parameterize the model to match the long-run growth characteristics of the
U.S. economy. In Section 3 we study the short- and medium-term dynamics
of the economy when there is capital-embodied technical change; in particu-
lar, we study how the skill premium and labor income share respond. Section
4 concludes.
3 Goldin and Katz (1999) argue that in the United States the skill premium declined
(increased) in the ﬁrst half (second half) of the twentieth century.
4 Research spillovers between labor of either sort and capital are not present in our model.
Such spillovers would imply that there must be long-run technological change to augment the
capital input, and this would make the capital-labor share unbalanced.
5A similar mechanism is used by Goodfriend and McDermott (1998) to explain the deter-




The model has the simplest possible consumer preference structure: prefer-





where Ct is consumption at time t and β is the time discount factor. This pref-
erencespeciﬁcationimpliesthatthegoaloftheconsumer,orofanybenevolent
government planner, is simply to maximize present-value output using a con-
stant interest rate that is equal to the consumer’s rate of discount.
Production of Final Output: Capital-Skill Complementarity
A ﬁnal output good Y (we omit time subscripts whenever there is no risk
of confusion) is produced with three intermediate inputs, Yk, Ys, and Yu,t o
an aggregate production function F. These intermediate inputs are in turn
produced from the primary factors capital, skilled labor, and unskilled la-
bor, respectively. We assume that F is of the nested constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) form, as in KORV (2000):
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with ρ,σ ≤ 1. The elasticity of substitution between skilled labor and capital
is 1/(1 − ρ). This elasticity is less than one—that is, ρ ≤ 0—since we
assume that capital and skilled labor are complementary. On the other hand,
the elasticity between unskilled labor and the aggregate of skilled labor and
capitalis1/(1 − σ). Thiselasticityisgreaterthanone—thatis,σ ≥ 0—since
we assume that capital and unskilled labor are substitutes.
Production of Intermediate Goods
The production of intermediate goods is central to our model: it is where
the “directed technical change” appears. Following a large part of the recent
literature on endogenous growth, we assume that productivity increases via
an expansion in the variety of inputs with which each intermediate good is
produced.6 At any point in time, a type j intermediate good Yj, j = k,s,u,
6 See, for example, Romer (1990).A. Hornstein and P. Krusell: Capital-Embodiment Revolution 33









, ν ≥ 1. (3)




, is produced from a primary factor
with a distinct technology, which we discuss shortly. In a symmetric equilib-
rium, all specialized inputs to production of the same intermediate good are
operated at the same level, Yj(i) = yj for all i. This implies the following





Production of Specialized Inputs
Finally,theproductionofspecializedinputsiscloselytiedtothethreeprimary
factors. A unit of capital produces one unit of any type of specialized input
used in the production of capital-based intermediate goods:
Yk(i) = K(i), (5)
whereK(i)istheamountofcapitalusedforspecializedinputi. Analogously,
we have for skilled and unskilled labor
Ys(i) = S(i)and Yu(i) = U(i), (6)
where S(i) and U(i)are the amounts of skilled and unskilled labor, respec-
tively, used for specialized input i.
The resource availability for each primary factor is as follows. At each
point in time t there is a ﬁxed amount of capital Kt, and over time, Kt can be
increased by foregoing consumption. The other primary factors, skilled and
unskilledlabor, S andU,areﬁxed. Wecanthinkoftheseastheamountofraw
labor hours available in the two groups. We thus abstract from variations in
the amount of hours supplied by each worker, in labor force participation, and
in population growth. Perhaps more important, we abstract from education
decisions; that is a topic worthy of further study.
In an equilibrium the demand and supply for primary factors is equalized,
and in a symmetric equilibrium the total demand for a primary factor is equal
totheproductofthenumberandlevelofthespecializedinputsusingthefactor
nkyk = K, nsys = S, and nuyu = U. (7)
Given the reduced form production function for a symmetric equilibrium, we
can relate intermediate goods production to the primary factors as follows:
Yk = AkK, Ys = AsS, and Yu = AuU, (8)
where Aj ≡ n
1/(ν−1)
j . The variables Aj will play the role of the productivity
speciﬁc to factor j = k, s, and u. Notice that the development of more spe-
cializedinputs,nj,increasesproductivity,Aj,sinceν>1. Thisdevelopment
occurs through R&D and will be discussed below.34 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Investment-Speciﬁc Technical Change
The aggregate resource constraint in the economy is
Ct + It/qt = Yt, (9)
where the price of new capital goods—that is, investment It—in terms of
consumption is 1/qt. Investment increases the capital stock
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + It (10)
after depreciation, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. An increase in qt is a form of technical
progress, because it makes investment cheaper, and we call this form of tech-
nical progress “capital-embodied” or “investment-speciﬁc.” We will consider
a gradual increase in qt from an initial stable level to a new plateau, thus
corresponding to a gradual fall in the price of new capital goods.
R&D
Finally, the development of new technologies occurs in a similar way for
the three kinds of intermediate goods: there is a ﬁxed amount of basic R&D
input,R,thatcanbedividedintoproducingnewvarietiesofspecializedinputs
of type j = k, s, and u. One unit of research input produces bj ¯ nj new
specialized j inputs, where ¯ nj is a weighted average of existing research
stocks (varieties). That is, researchers stand on the shoulders of past giants:
with a larger available stock of past research in the form of many existing
varieties, research productivity is higher. Besides R&D externalities from
previously developed varieties to new varieties used in the production of the
same intermediate input, there are also spillovers from R&D activities for one
intermediate input type to other intermediate input types. In particular, we
assume














¯ nk = nk. (13)
We assume that R&D spillovers are limited to skilled and unskilled labor
research. These research spillovers between skilled and unskilled labor are
symmetric and captured by the parameter φ ∈ [−1,1]. Capital research does
not lead to, nor does it receive, any spillovers.
Finally, the number of available specialized varieties depreciates at rates
dk, ds, and du, respectively. Although we can interpret this assumption as
exogenous obsolescence of ideas, it is essentially a technical requirement that
is necessary to guarantee the local stability of balanced growth paths.A. Hornstein and P. Krusell: Capital-Embodiment Revolution 35
Summarizing the R&D sector, we have
nk,t+1 = (1 − dk)nk,t + bk¯ nk,tRk,t, (14)
ns,t+1 = (1 − ds)ns,t + bs ¯ ns,tRs,t, (15)
nu,t+1 = (1 − du)nu,t + bu¯ nu,tRu,t, (16)
whereRj,t istheamountofR&Dinputdevotedtotypej productdevelopment.
The market for R&D inputs clears
Rk,t + Rs,t + Ru,t = R. (17)
Markets and Decentralized Equilibrium
Themarketstructureweconsiderisquitestandardforthiskindofmodelsetup.
There is perfect competition in the ﬁnal goods market. Intermediate goods
are bought and sold by perfectly competitive ﬁrms, too, but their inputs—the
specializedinputs—areprovidedbymonopolisticallycompetitiveﬁrms. Each
such monopolistic ﬁrm thus owns a right (inﬁnitely-lived patent) to produce
its good that it once bought from an R&D ﬁrm, and it controls the quantity
supplied in every period—with knowledge of the demand curve—in order to
maximize proﬁts. With free entry into the monopolistic industry, the stream
of proﬁts is enough to just cover the cost of the patent. Researchers, or R&D
labs,areperfectcompetitors,asaretheprovidersoftheprimaryfactorscapital
andlabor. Theoutputofresearchthathasmarketvalueisthepatent; theeffect
on research productivity of future research efforts is an externality.
We will now look at proﬁt maximization conditions for the different kinds
of ﬁrms, starting with the ﬁnal output sector.
Final Output
We normalized the price of the ﬁnal output at one. The proﬁt of a competitive
ﬁnal goods producer is
F(Y k,Y s,Y u) − PkK − PsS − PuU. (18)
A proﬁt-maximizing ﬁnal goods producer equates the marginal cost of a type
j intermediate input—that is, its price, Pj—to the marginal value product of
that input:










For the last equality we have used the fact that if F has constant returns to
scale, then its derivatives are homogeneous of degree zero.36 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Intermediate Goods
A competitive intermediate goods producer takes prices and technology, in
particular the number of available specialized inputs, as given. The proﬁt of















Conditional on the price of the intermediate good and the level of intermedi-
ate goods production, this equation deﬁnes the quantity demanded Yj (i) for
specialized input i as a function of its price, pj (i). This demand function has
a constant price elasticity, ν.
In a symmetric equilibrium, Yj(i) ≡ yj (it does not depend on i), pj(i) =
pj, and Yj = n
ν/(ν−1)
j yj = Aν










Specialized inputs are produced by monopolistically competitive ﬁrms; that
is, they take into account the effect of the price they set on their sales while
taking the level of demand and the price of the intermediate input for which
they supply specialized inputs as given. For example, a ﬁrm that produces a
specialized input for the capital-type intermediate good hires capital services
K (i) at the rental rate wk and maximizes proﬁts:
maxpk(i)Yk(i) − wkK(i), (23)
subject to the inverse demand function for pk(i) given in (21). Because of the
demand function’s constant price elasticity, the proﬁt-maximizing choice sets
the specialized input price as a constant markup µ ≡ ν/(ν −1) over marginal
cost:
pk(i) = µwk. (24)
Period proﬁts are then
πk(i) = (µ − 1)wkK(i). (25)A. Hornstein and P. Krusell: Capital-Embodiment Revolution 37
Similarly, we obtain for ﬁrms using skilled and unskilled labor
ps(i) = µws and πs(i) = (µ − 1)wsS(i), (26)
pu(i) = µwu and πu(i) = (µ − 1)wuU(i). (27)
The capital value at time t of a specialized ﬁrm using factor j is
Vj,t = πj,t + β(1 − dj)Vj,t+1, (28)
where we have used the fact that the ﬁrm dies randomly between one period
and the next with probability dj and ﬁrms discount future returns with the
representative household’s discount factor, β.
The Research Sector
LetwR denotethepriceoftheservicesprovidedbyoneunitofresearch. Each
unit of research produces bj ¯ nj new varieties that use the primary factor j in
the next period. Alternatively, in order to obtain one specialized input i, one
needstohire1/bj ¯ nj unitsofresearchservices. Freeentryintheresearchsector
amounts to the requirement that the value of the patent to operate production
of specialized input i using the basic input j from the next period on has to
equal the cost of obtaining that patent. Thus,
wR,t/bj ¯ nj,t = βVj,t+1 (29)
is the zero-proﬁt condition for the research sector.
Consumer Savings
The intertemporal ﬁrst-order condition for the consumer equates the marginal












In this economy, there will be long-run productivity and output growth pro-
vided that the research activity is potent enough. We will assume that this is
the case. What is of more interest, however, is the form that this growth will
take. Wewillfocusattentiononbalancedgrowthpaths(BGPs)—thatis, paths
where each variable of interest grows at a constant percentage rate—and all
factors are used in production and account for positive and constant shares of
total income. This economy also allows for asymptotic growth paths where
some factors become unimportant in the long run and their income shares
become arbitrarily small. We do not study these asymptotic growth paths but
restrict attention to locally stable balanced growth paths, and we assume that38 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
initialconditionsaresuchthattheeconomyisinalocallystableneighborhood
of the balanced growth path.
For the analysis of the BGP, we also assume that there is no capital-
embodied technical change; that is, the relative price of capital is constant.
Whentherelativepriceofcapitalisnotconstantbutdeclinesataconstantrate,
a BGP exists only if the elasticity of substitution between all primary factors
in the production function (2) is unitary (Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell
1997). Equalandunitaryelasticitiesofsubstitutionare, however, inconsistent
with the observed differences in factor-substitution elasticities.
A BGP with Labor-Augmenting Technical Change
We ﬁrst establish that the BGP of our economy with endogenous directed
technicalchangehasthesamepropertiesastheBGPoftheneoclassicalgrowth
model with exogenous labor-augmenting technical change.7 Namely, output,
capital, andtheproductivityofskilledandunskilledlaborallgrowatthesame
rate, and the productivity of capital is constant.
Prices for specialized inputs, pk, ps, and pu (where we have removed the
index i because of symmetry), are constant and equal markups on the prices
of the associated primary factors K, S, and U (equations (24), (26), and (27)).




















The marginal products of intermediate inputs depend only on the intermediate
input ratios, Yk/Ys = (AkK)/(AsS)and Yu/Ys = (AuU)/(AsS),because the
production function F is constant returns to scale. This in turn implies that
the factor income ratios depend only on the intermediate input ratios. Since
by assumption the two-factor income ratios are nontrivial constants on a BGP,
the intermediate input ratios are then constant. Thus, on any BGP, (a) As
and Au grow at the same rate g, since U and S are constant; and (b) AkK
grows at the same rate as As. This implies that intermediate inputs Yk, Ys, Yu,
and output Y all grow at rate g. Furthermore, because we assume that q is
constant on a BGP, capital K has to grow at the rate of ﬁnal output; otherwise,
the investment share goes to zero or one. Because output grows at the same
rate as As, so does K. Hence, Ak must be constant.
7 For a similar environment, this was established by Acemoglu (2003).A. Hornstein and P. Krusell: Capital-Embodiment Revolution 39
The Equations that Characterize a BGP
The BGP is characterized by the constant (a) productivity growth rate g; (b)
relative productivity of skilled and unskilled labor ˜ Au ≡ Au/As; (c) ratio
of capital-skilled labor productivity ˜ K ≡ K/As; and (d) capital productivity
Ak. We ﬁrst turn to the R&D sector to derive two equations that determine
the growth rate and relative productivity of unskilled and skilled labor. Cap-
ital productivity and the normalized level of capital then adjust to satisfy the
optimal capital accumulation conditions.
Constant capital productivity Ak together with (14) imply that
dk = bkRk. (33)
Since productivity growth rates are constant on the BGP and the total amount
of resources, R, available for R&D purposes is constant, the R&D resources
directed to the different uses are also constant. The restriction on the total
amount of R&D input resources then delivers one equation in the unknowns
Rs andRu: Rs+Ru = R−dk/bk. Fromequations(15)and(16)equalgrowth
in As and Au now implies that
1 − ds + bs ˜ A
(1−φ)(ν−1)
2
u Rs = 1 − du + bu ˜ A
−(1−φ)(ν−1)
2
u (R − dk/bk − Rs). (34)
This equation determines R&D resources devoted to the improvement of
skilled labor productivity Rs as a function of the relative productivity of un-
skilled labor ˜ Au. Together with the R&D equation for skilled labor, this
determines aggregate growth:




The economic incentives that determine the direction of technical change
are described by the free-entry conditions for R&D (equation (29)). These
conditions imply that the marginal payoffs from R&D in each of the three
basic uses are equalized to the marginal cost of R&D:
wR = bj ¯ njVj for j = s,u,k. (36)
The capital value of a ﬁrm that produces a specialized input is equal to the
expected present value of current and future proﬁts from production. For
example, from equation (26) a ﬁrm that produces specialized inputs from
skilled labor has proﬁts (µ − 1)wsS/ns = wsSA1−ν
s , and proﬁts decline at
thegrossrate(1+g)2−ν sincemoreandmoreﬁrmshavetosharetheavailable
stock of skilled labor. On a BGP the capital value of such a ﬁrm is
Vs,t = πs,t + β(1 − ds)πs,t+1 + ...
= (wsS/ns)





1 − β(1 − ds)(1 + g)2−ν. (37)40 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Notice that the capital value and therefore the return to R&D that improves
the productivity of skilled labor is proportional to the total factor income of
skilledlabor. Similarexpressionscanbederivedforthecapitalvaluesofﬁrms
that use unskilled labor or capital.
EqualizationofreturnstoR&Dfromproductivityimprovementsforskilled








1 − β(1 − ds)(1 + g)2−ν
1 − β(1 − du)(1 + g)2−ν, (38)
which involves the growth rate g, relative productivity ˜ Au, and the normal-
ized capital stock Ak ˜ K through the relative wages. Equalization of returns
to R&D from productivity improvements for skilled labor and capital and








1 − β(1 − ds)(1 + g)2−ν
1 − β(1 − dk)(1 + g)
. (39)
Note that the relative incentives to do R&D depend on the relative factor
income shares.
Equations (34)–(39) involve four equations in four unknowns: Rs, g, ˜ Au,
and Ak ˜ K. We will brieﬂy discuss the solution to this system below. Having
solved for these four variables, we ﬁnd the remaining endogenous variables
by using the BGP version of our equations. First, we determine the constant
productivity of capital Ak. Given the exogenous price of new capital q,w e
get a constant value for the rental rate of capital wk from the optimal capital
accumulation condition (30). Given markup pricing (24), the rental rate is
equal to pk/µ = PkAk/µ = FkAk/µ, and since the marginal product of
capital Fk depends on known factor input ratios, this delivers Ak.
To ﬁnd levels of variables at a point in time, we need to initialize our state
variables at time 0. The state variables of the system are K, Ak, As, and Au,
of which we already know Ak. Thus, let K (0) = 1. Then As (0) is implied
by Ak ˜ K = AkK/As. Finally, Au (0) follows from knowing ˜ Au. Given the
growth rates of all variables, we can now solve for the levels of quantities and
prices at all points in time. Perhaps the last variable to solve for is the factor
rental of the research input, wR; it equals a present value of proﬁts, where
each proﬁt ﬂow is a ﬁxed fraction of labor costs per product.
Characteristics of Growth Paths
Inoureconomy,capital-embodiedtechnicalchange—thatis,technicalprogress
in the investment goods sector—temporarily increases the growth rate and the
skill premium, but it does not affect growth or the skill premium in the long
run. The temporary effects of a once-and-for-all productivity increase in the
investment goods sector are, however, extremely persistent. In our econ-
omy, deviations from the BGP path are persistent because induced technicalA. Hornstein and P. Krusell: Capital-Embodiment Revolution 41
progress can be self-fulﬁlling, which makes the economy potentially unstable
and introduces the possibility of multiple BGPs. Counteracting this desta-
bilizing force is a spillover between R&D activities devoted to productivity
improvements of unskilled and skilled labor. In the next section we will show
that for a calibrated version of the model economy, the research spillovers just
overcome the self-fulﬁlling aspect of the growth process and the economy is
just barely stable, which implies the high persistence of deviations from the
BGP.
The Role of Investment Technology for Growth andWage
Inequality
Thevariableq representstherelativeproductivityoftheinvestmentgoodssec-
tor. One unit of ﬁnal output can be transformed into one unit of consumption
or q units of new machines. Equivalently, 1/q is the relative price of new
capital in terms of consumption goods. As we have just argued above, this
technological parameter has no impact on long-run growth in this economy.
Essentially,investmenttechnologypinsdownthelevelofthemarginalproduct
of capital in production, but that is a level effect in this growing economy: it
determines Ak, the productivity of installed capital that is constant over time.
Growth is determined by R&D decisions, which respond to proﬁts from inno-
vation. Since proﬁts are collected as a (constant) markup over costs, and costs
are the expenditures on the primary factors, R&D decisions respond to factor
income. The relative allocation of R&D resources toward factor-productivity
improvements then depends on relative income shares. Finally, given the ho-
mogeneity of the production function, relative income shares depend on the
relative input ratios (Yk/Ys and Yu/Ys), but not on the productivity of capital
per se.
This result also applies to an economy where consumers desire to smooth
consumption,thatis,whereutilityisnotlinear. Theoptimalcapital-accumula-
tion condition (30) then includes the long-run growth rate g, but this variable
hasalreadybeendeterminedintheR&Dsector. Theoptimalcapital-accumula-
tion condition is still limited to the determination of Ak.









and it depends only on the relative input ratios. Since the relative input ratios
are entirely determined in the R&D sector, the investment technology param-
eter q does not have a long-run impact on wage inequality either. Again, a
permanentincreaseinq increasesAk,theproductivityofinstalledcapital,per-
manently; however, this variable does not inﬂuence Fs/Fu in the long run. In
other words, the variables Au/As and K/As will adjust over time until Fs/Fu
returns to its initial value. Over the course of this adjustment, of course, there42 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
are temporary effects on the skill premium, and the subject of the work below
is to study these temporary effects.8
Can Technology Growth Be Self-Fulﬁlling?
In our economy R&D decisions depend on scale: if the productivity of a
primary factor is large—that is, if there are many specialized inputs using
this factor—then this factor gets paid a high rental rate and receives a high
income, which in turn increases the incentive to do more R&D for this factor.
This argument, however, applies to all factors, and given the ﬁnite resources
that can be used for R&D, what matters is the relative allocation of these
resourcesamongcompetinguses. Thusthebehaviorofrelativefactorincomes
determines the relative allocation of R&D resources. As was pointed out by
Acemoglu (2002b), the impact on relative factor incomes is connected to the
substitutability features of the intermediate goods in ﬁnal output production.
Considerthecaseofcapitalandskilledlaborﬁrst. Supposetheproductiv-
ity of skilled labor increases, that is, the relative supply of skilled-labor-based
intermediate inputs increases. Since capital and labor are gross complements,
the relative income of skilled labor falls, and resources are redirected toward
capital accumulation. This in turn increases the relative supply of capital-
based intermediate inputs, and the process is stable.
Alternatively, consider the case of skilled and unskilled labor, which are
substitutes. Nowanincreaseoftherelativesupplyofskilled-labor-basedinter-
mediateinputsincreasestheincomeofskilledlaborrelativetounskilledlabor,
which leads to even more R&D resources devoted to the creation of skilled-
labor-using specialized inputs, which in turn increases the relative supply
of skilled-labor-based intermediate inputs. This productivity growth process
feedsonitselfandtherelativeproductivityofskilledlaborincreasesmoreand
more, such that in the end the economy is effectively specialized in skilled-
labor-based intermediate inputs. In order for the economy to remain stable,
we need another mechanism that counteracts the scale effects: technology
spillovers between the two kinds of labor. With spillovers, productivity im-
provements for skilled labor lower the R&D cost for unskilled labor, and if
these spillovers are strong enough, they can stabilize the R&D process and
preventacompletespecialization. Thestrengthofspilloversisreﬂectedinthe
parameter φ: with φ = 1, there are no spillovers and the strength of spillovers
increases as φ declines.
8 Notice that the basic supplies of skilled and unskilled workers, S and U, directly inﬂuence
the long-run skill premium, even though they do not at all inﬂuence the relative total wage bills of
the two groups. An interesting issue is how the endogenous accumulation of skills (e.g., education
or on-the-job learning), which makes the relative supply of skilled labor endogenous, would interact
with technological change to determine long-run wage inequality. We have argued before that there
are limits to the extent that the relative skill endowment can be affected, and therefore we do not
pursue this issue.A. Hornstein and P. Krusell: Capital-Embodiment Revolution 43
Thepossibilityofself-fulﬁllingproductivitygrowthpathsinoureconomy
suggests that there might be multiple BGPs. To simplify the study of multiple
BGPs, assume that the number of specialized inputs depreciates at the same
rate in all sectors, d ≡ du = ds = dk. We can then solve equations (34) and












(R − dk/bk) − d. (41)
Note that with spillovers the growth rate is a non-monotone function of the
relative productivity of unskilled labor ˜ Au. Without spillovers (φ = 1), the
growthrateisaconstant,independentoftherelativeproductivity. Nowusethe
nested CES aggregate production function (2) to derive explicit expressions





























Inserting these two expressions in equations (38) and (39), we obtain
1 = #1 ˜ Aσ+(1−φ)(ν−1)
u

















1 − β(1 − d)(1 + g)2−ν
1 − β(1 − d)(1 + g)
, (45)
where #1 and #2 are constants and g depends on ˜ Au. We now have two
equations in two unknowns, Ak ˜ K/S and ˜ Au. They deﬁne two curves relating
the two unknowns, and the balanced growth path is found as an intersection of
the two curves. Is there a solution to this system, and if so, is there more than
one? We will not go further here than to point out that both equations deﬁne
upward-sloping curves so long as ρ<0 <σ, which are the assumptions we
use because of the data on cross elasticities between different inputs.9 And
with two upward-sloping curves, multiple solutions are not only possible but,
as we have veriﬁed numerically, hard to avoid in this framework. This is in
contrasttothesetupsinAcemoglu(2002b,2003),whichdeliveruniquesteady
states. Because of our three-factor setup here, multiplicity is hard to avoid.
9 To simplify the exposition, we treat the growth rate in equation (45) as a constant; that
is, we ignore the feedback from equation (41). The dependence of g on ˜ Au may cause non-
monotonicities, but that is only a local property; globally, the equation deﬁnes an upward-sloping
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The interpretation is the one hinted at in several places above. On the
right-hand side of equation (44) is the relative return on R&D with respect to
productivity improvements of unskilled to skilled labor, and on the right-hand
side of equation (45) is the relative R&D return with respect to capital and
skilled labor. The two unknowns are the relative productivities of unskilled
laborandcapital(relativetothatofskilledlabor;inthecaseofcapital,wemea-
sure the stock times the productivity). In equation (44), a higher productivity
of unskilled labor raises the relative return on unskilled labor, because skilled
and unskilled labor are substitutes (σ>0) and because of the market size
effect ((1 − φ)(ν − 1)>0) if there are spillovers. To balance the increased
relative return of unskilled labor, the productivity of capital has to increase.
Because of capital-skill complementarity, σ>0 >ρ , the higher capital pro-
ductivity increases the return to skilled labor. In equation (45), an increase in
the productivity of unskilled labor gives a reinforcing scale effect, because it
can be viewed as a relative decrease in the productivity of capital, which is
balanced in this case by an increase in the direct productivity of capital, since
skilled labor and capital are complements (ρ<0).
When there are multiple balanced growth paths, it is important to check
“local stability” of each of these: do small deviations of the state variables
from the balanced growth path lead back to the balanced path or do they
lead away from it? In our numerical examples, we found one stable and one
unstable path, the last of which is economically irrelevant (since no initial
conditions would lead there). We also found cases where there is only one,
unstable balanced growth path. In this case, the scale effects are simply too
strong to admit convergence to a balanced outcome: any deviations from the
balanced path would lead away from it. We tend to ﬁnd at least one stable
equilibrium when the spillovers are strong, i.e., when φ is low, and when
knowledge depreciation is high, i.e., when d is close to one.
2. CALIBRATION
Our intention is to provide a quantitative statement on how a decline of the
relative price of capital affects wage inequality. Furthermore, our model is
sufﬁciently complicated such that we cannot analytically characterize the sta-
bility properties of its balanced growth path. We therefore solve the model
numerically, and in order to do this we have to decide what are empirically
relevant values of the model’s parameters. In the following we parameterize
theeconomysuchthatitsbalancedgrowthpathisconsistentwithobservations
on the U.S. economy in the latter part of the twentieth century.
We assume that a time period represents one year, and we choose the
time discount factor β such that the annual interest rate is 4 percent. The
annual depreciation rate for equipment capital in the United States is δ =
0.125. KORV(2000)estimatetheelasticityparametersforthetwo-stageCESA. Hornstein and P. Krusell: Capital-Embodiment Revolution 45
production function (2) as ρ =− 0.5 and σ = 0.4. We set the specialized
input parameter ν = 11 such that the equilibrium markup is 10 percent above
marginal cost, µ = 1.1. This choice is at the upper bound for estimates of
proﬁtratesintheU.S.economy. Acemoglu(2002a)providesvariousestimates
of the factor income ratios of skilled to unskilled labor. We set the ratio
wsS/wuU = 0.5, which corresponds to Acemoglu’s estimate of this ratio in
the 1990s for a broad deﬁnition of skilled labor. We set the capital income
share in ﬁnal output to one-third, which roughly corresponds to the capital
income share in the United States.
Estimates by the National Science Foundation (NSF) suggest that in the
United States R&D expenditures are less than 3 percent of GDP. The NSF
estimates include public and private expenditures on R&D. In the following
we interpret the R&D input as a type of labor and include the value of R&D
inputs in the model economy’s measure of GDP. Conditional on the factor
income shares and assuming equal depreciation rates of knowledge, d = dj,
the R&D share in GDP determines the depreciation rate d. The R&D share
in GDP is increasing in d, and with d = 0 the R&D share is 4.9 percent
conditional on the other income shares. The BGP equilibrium is not stable for
d = 0, but we obtain a stable BGP for d = 0.01, which implies a BGP R&D
share of 5.9 percent. In the following we interpret the R&D input as another
type of skilled labor.
No quantitative evidence is available on the R&D externality. We set
the R&D externality parameter for skilled and unskilled labor to φ = 0.5.
Larger externalities, smaller φ, have no appreciable impact on the medium-
term to long-term dynamics. Smaller externalities, larger φ, make the effects
of shocks more persistent, but for φ approaching 0.9 we can no longer ﬁnd a
stable BGP.
Direct observations on ˜ Au, Yu/Ys,o rYk/Ys, are also not available. For
the calibration exercise the values of these variables and of S/U, ω, and λ are
not determined. This is not a problem since, conditional on the calibration
so far, the local dynamics around the BGP are independent of the choice for
these variables. In the following we normalize ˜ Au = Yu/Ys = Yk/Ys = 1.
3. RESULTS
In the previous discussion of the BGP we argue that a permanent change of
the relative price of capital does not affect the economy’s long-run growth
rate, factor income shares, or skill premium. We now want to argue that even
though the effects of a permanent change in the relative price of capital are
transitory, they are nevertheless very persistent. For this purpose we perform
two experiments. First, we show that in response to a one-time permanent
decline of the relative price of capital, the relative wage of skilled labor and
the wage income share increases and these effects are extremely persistent. In46 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 1 The Medium- to Long-Run Response of Endogenous State
Variables to a Permanent Decline of the Price of Capital
the introduction we point out that capital-embodied technical change is not a
one-time event, but an ongoing process. In a second experiment we therefore
model ongoing embodied technical change through successive reductions of
the relative price of capital and show that the skill premium and labor income
share increase signiﬁcantly over time and stay above their long-run values for
a very long time.
We study a local approximation of the dynamic response of our economy
toanexogenousshock. Sinceoureconomyisgrowingovertime,weﬁrsthave
to transform the dynamic system such that all variables are stationary. This
is possible since we study a BGP where all variables grow at constant rates.
The state variables of the transformed system are


Ak,t, ˜ Kt, ˜ Au,t

.
A preliminary observation is worth making before going into the details
of the experiment. If one computes the relative wages of skilled and unskilled
workers in this economy treating productivity and investment levels as exoge-
nous, it is apparent that an increase in q, which automatically increases the
capital stock, must increase the relative wage of skilled labor because σ>ρ .
This can easily be seen by taking the ratio of Fs to Fu and using σ>ρ :
this expression is increasing in K. This essentially is the argument in KORV
(2000) about why the skill premium has been increasing. Our main question
below is, how does capital accumulation and endogenous directed technical
change respond to the fall in the price of new capital goods?A. Hornstein and P. Krusell: Capital-Embodiment Revolution 47
Experiment 1: A Permanent 1 Percent Decline of the
Relative Price of Capital
Figure 1 shows the response of the state variables to a 1 percent permanent
decline of the relative price of capital. On impact, as investment in capital
becomes more attractive and the economy starts to accumulate more capital
and more resources are devoted to the improvement of capital productivity,
both ˜ K ≡ K/As and Ak increase. After the initial impact, the economy
devotes more resources to the improvement of skilled labor productivity since
skilled labor and capital are complementary in production, and consequently
the relative productivity of unskilled labor ˜ Au ≡ Au/As declines. We have
argued above that the BGP value of ˜ Au is independent of the relative price
of capital and the relative productivity of unskilled labor returns to its long-
run value over time. On the other hand, the BGP values of the normalized
capital stock and the productivity of capital depend on the price of capital. In
particular, the productivity of capital declines and the capital stock increases
with the decline of the relative price of capital. From Figure 1 it is apparent
that the shock has a very persistent impact on the state of the economy. Recall
that one period represents a year. Even after 1,000 years the economy still has
a long way to go to arrive at its new BGP.
The economy’s GDP growth, the labor income share, the skill premium,
and the relative wage of R&D labor all increase following a decline of the
relative price of capital (see Figure 2).10 As discussed above, the BGP growth
rate, labor income share, and relative wages are independent of the relative
price of capital. Whereas the impact on the growth rate dissipates very fast,
the effect on relative wages and the labor income share is very persistent.11
The quantitative effect of a one-time 1 percent reduction of the price of capital
is small; for example, the skill premium increases by less than 1 percent.
Experiment 2: A Sequence of Relative Price of
Capital Reductions
In our economy a BGP does not exist if the relative price of capital declines at
a constant rate. In order to model the effects of the observed secular decline
of the relative price of capital, we therefore assume that this price declines at
a constant rate for 100 years and then remains constant forever. We base our
10 The substantial volatility for the GDP growth rate can be attributed to the fact that prefer-
ences are linear in consumption. With concave utility in consumption, there would be an incentive
to smooth consumption and we would not see the wild swings in the GDP growth rate.
11 It may appear odd that the relative wage of R&D labor is less than the wage of unskilled
labor, but remember that we have said nothing about the units of R&D labor embodied in an
R&D worker. Thus, the scale of the relative wage is arbitrary. The same can be said about the
relative wage of skilled and unskilled workers.48 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 2 The Response of GDP Growth, Labor Income Share, and
Relative Wages to a Permanent Decline of the Price of Capital
studyofthemedium-tolong-runeffectsofthepricedeclineonalocalapprox-
imation of the economy’s dynamics. We therefore want to avoid deviating too
much from the BGP and limit ourselves to a 0.5 percent annual rate of price
decline. This is substantially less than the 3 percent annual rate of decline for
the relative price of equipment capital observed for the United States (Green-
wood, Hercowitz, and Krusell 1997). Our example should therefore only be
interpreted as a quantitative illustration of the effect of an ongoing decline of
the relative price of capital.
Figure 3 shows that as long as the relative price of capital declines, the
economy’s growth rate, labor income share, and relative wage of skilled labor
andR&Dlaborallincrease. Theimpactofthecapitalpricedeclineonrelative
wages is quantitatively important. Over the 100-year decline of the relative
price of capital, the skill premium—that is, the price of skilled labor relative
to unskilled labor—increases by about 40 percent, and the relative price of
labor employed in the R&D sector increases by 15 percent. The change of
the GDP growth rate and the labor income share would not be noticeable in
the data. Changes of the magnitude implied by the model, one-tenth of a
percentage point for the growth rate and half a percentage point for the laborA. Hornstein and P. Krusell: Capital-Embodiment Revolution 49
Figure 3 The Response of GDP Growth, Labor Income Share, and
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income share, are dominated by other business-cycle-related ﬂuctuations of




We ﬁnd in this paper that a permanent decline in the relative price of capital
has long-lasting, but not permanent, effects on wage inequality. In particular,
we ﬁnd that cheaper capital goods initially raise the relative wage of skilled
workers due to capital-skill complementarity. In addition, cheaper capital
goods also initially induce more technical change to augment the existing
capitalstock—a“scaleeffect”duetotheincentivestodoR&D—whichworks
toward even larger wage inequality. However, in our model economy, the
other factors of production eventually respond due to (a) complementarity in
production with skilled labor and (b) spillovers from research into skilled-
labor intensive industries to those mainly using unskilled labor. We do not
have any way of knowing how strong such spillovers are; in the model we50 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
assume that they are strong enough to counteract the initial impulse toward
inequality. If they are in fact weaker than that, the long-run outcome likely
wouldmaketheshareoftotalincomeaccruingtounskilledworkersgotozero.
Our analysis focuses on how the initial impulse—the fall in the price
of new capital—induces directed R&D. We have, however, abstracted from
incentives to accumulate skill. In response to a higher wage premium to skill,
one would expect more skill accumulation. How strong this effect is in reality
is an open question. How it would interact with the other factors driving
long-run inequality in our model is also an open question. We leave these
interesting questions, as well as policy analysis, for future directed research.
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